BeepTrace: blockchain-enabled privacy-preserving contact tracing for COVID-19 pandemic and beyond by Xu, Hao et al.
  
 
 
 
 
Xu, H., Zhang, L., Onireti, O., Fang, Y., Buchanan, W. J. and Imran, M. A. (2020) 
BeepTrace: blockchain-enabled privacy-preserving contact tracing for COVID-19 
pandemic and beyond. IEEE Internet of Things Journal, (doi: 
10.1109/JIOT.2020.3025953). 
 
   
There may be differences between this version and the published version. You are 
advised to consult the publisher’s version if you wish to cite from it. 
 
 
 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk/223382/  
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
Deposited on: 23 September 2020 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Enlighten – Research publications by members of the University of Glasgow 
http://eprints.gla.ac.uk  
  
1BeepTrace: Blockchain-enabled Privacy-preserving
Contact Tracing for COVID-19 Pandemic and
Beyond
Hao Xu, Lei Zhang, Oluwakayode Onireti, Yang Fang, William J Buchanan, Muhammad Ali Imran
Abstract—The outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic has exposed
an urgent need for effective contact tracing solutions through
mobile phone applications to prevent the infection from spreading
further. However, due to the nature of contact tracing, public
concern on privacy issues has been a bottleneck to the existing
solutions, which is significantly affecting the uptake of contact
tracing applications across the globe. In this paper, we present
a blockchain-enabled privacy-preserving contact tracing scheme:
BeepTrace, where we propose to adopt blockchain bridging the
user/patient and the authorized solvers to desensitize the user
ID and location information. Compared with recently proposed
contact tracing solutions, our approach shows higher security
and privacy with the additional advantages of being battery
friendly and globally accessible. Results show viability in terms
of the required resource at both server and mobile phone
perspectives. Through breaking the privacy concerns of the
public, the proposed BeepTrace solution can provide a timely
framework for authorities, companies, software developers and
researchers to fast develop and deploy effective digital contact
tracing applications, to conquer COVID-19 pandemic soon.
Meanwhile, the open initiative of BeepTrace allows worldwide
collaborations, integrate existing tracing and positioning solutions
with the help of blockchain technology.
Index Terms—COVID19, Coronavirus, Digital contact tracing,
Privacy-preserving, Distributed system, Blockchain, Distributed
Ledger Technology, Pandemic, BeepTrace
I. INTRODUCTION
Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) is an infectious
disease that is caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome
coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2) [1]. The disease has spread into
most nations across the globe thus sending billions of people
into lockdown as health services across the globe struggle to
cope. As of 18th May 2020, there have been 4,769,177 cases
and 316,898 deaths confirmed across 188 countries and terri-
tories [2]. At the time of writing this paper, there are still no
vaccines for COVID-19. Hence, non-pharmaceutical interven-
tions (NPIs), which aims at slowing down the transmission of
the disease by reducing the contact rate of people in the general
public [3], have been implemented by various countries across
the globe. NPIs largely targets social distancing (also known as
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physical distancing) by keeping a certain distance from others
and avoiding gathering together in large groups [4]. Strict
measures are adopted in most countries include the closing
of workplace, schools, social venues, and travel restrictions,
etc.
NPIs were found to be very effective in the H1NI influenza
pandemic (1918-1919), which was the last disease pandemic
at the scale of the COVID-19 pandemic, and without existing
vaccines [9]. Communities and cities that implemented NPI
early in COVID-19 pandemic are successfully reducing the
number of cases while the adopted measure remaining in
place. This resulted in a significant reduction in the mortality
rate. However, strict measures pose an immediate threat to
the economy. This matters as economic decline itself has an
adverse effect on many aspects of society including health.
Goldman Sachs has predicted that the US economy could
shrink by 24% in the second quarter of 2020, more than twice
as much as any decline ever recorded [10]. Most countries
across the globe are developing balanced strategies to take
both economy and a rebound of the COVID-19 into consid-
eration. Contact tracing has been a pillar of communicable
disease control in public health for decades and shows its
effectiveness on COVID-19 control in some countries. With no
obvious prospect of vaccines on the horizon [11], the strategy
of most governments across the globe (e.g. United States,
Spain, United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, etc.) for easing out
the social distancing restrictions centers more on track and
trace approach. This approach will further help to rescue the
economy while also saving lives and restoring some normality,
especially when the lockdown is lifted (or partially lifted) and
the society steps into a “New Normal”.
A. Contact tracing
Contact tracing is the process of identifying persons who
may have come into contact with an infected person and sub-
sequent collection of further information about these contacts
[12]. Contact tracing has a long history in preventing infectious
diseases, in the early stage of epidemiology, contact tracing
takes part with labor-intensive methods. The process relied
heavily on the recall of a (far from complete) list of people
whom they have been in contact with over the previous weeks,
or locations the confirmed person has been. Letters, phone
calls or emails can be used to inform people who might
be contacted. Thus, completeness and accuracy of the list,
timeliness and efficiency of the tracing are limited by such
a traditional contact tracing approach.
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COMPARISONS OF CURRENT CONTACT TRACING SOLUTIONS WITH PROPOSED BLOCKCHAIN-BASED SOLUTION (BEEPTRACE)
Name of solutions Positioning/grouping technology Power Usage
Security of
technology Coverage Privacy-preserving
Singapore TraceTogether [5] Bluetooth High Low Low No
Google/Apple Contact Tracing [6] Bluetooth High Low Low Yes, Partially
UK NHS Contact Tracing [7] Bluetooth High Low Low Yes, Partially
China Health Code System [8] GNSS, QR code Low Medium High No
BeepTrace (proposed solution) GNSS, Bluetooth, Cellular and WiFi Medium High High Yes
Until very recently, digitized contact tracing through smart-
phone apps are developed and deployed in some countries
to solve the bottlenecks of the labor intensive-methods. One
of the mainstream contact tracing approaches is to use Blue-
tooth signals from smartphones to detect encounters with
people with COVID-19. This approach does not use location
tracking or store users’ location data. In this approach, if
someone develops COVID-19 symptoms, an alert could be
sent to others that they might have infected, with minimum
intervention. There are two variants of the Bluetooth-based
contract tracking, namely, the centralized and the decentralized
model. Singapore’s TraceTogether [5] is an example of a
centralized model. On the other hand, the information is
kept on the user’s smartphone in the decentralized model
and this gives more control to the user. Processing and
matching for people who may have contacted COVID-19 are
made on the user’s smartphone in a decentralized model.
Moreover, the decentralized model has been promoted by an
international consortium including Google and Apple as it
promotes consent, transparency, and privacy [6]. In the former,
gathered anonymous data is uploaded to the server. Matches
are made with other contacts via processing on the server
if someone starts to develop the COVID-19 symptoms. For
simplicity, in the next, we omit the word “digital” and use the
term “contact tracing” representing the smartphone App-based
digital contact tracing.
B. Review of existing contact tracing solutions
In Table I, we review four of the most recently proposed
contact tracing approaches namely, TraceTogether from Sin-
gapore [5], Google/Apple joint contact tracing project [6],
NHS COVID-19 App [7], and China Health code system [8].
The metrics used in our evaluation include the positioning or
grouping technology, power usage, security of the technology,
coverage, and the level of privacy preservation.
TraceTogether is an App powered by Bluetrace [5] protocol
and it makes use of Bluetooth low energy (LE) to discover
and locally record clients in close proximity of a user. In
this scheme, the user is required to keep the device in an
active broadcasting state, hence drains the battery of the user
device. The Bluetooth technology has security concerns on
its vulnerable wireless interface, threats including bugging,
sniffing, and jamming are prominent to all Bluetooth-based
contact tracing solutions. There is a high risk of replay attacks
to the contact tracing network, which may later cause a
massive scale of panic to the public.
User privacy may be considered preserved in terms of the
macro-scale public, but it is almost transparent inside a local
group with vulnerability at PHY and MAC layers. It is also
worth pointing out the vulnerability makes replay and spoofing
attacks very dangerous for COVID-19 contact tracing, where
the misinformation does more harm than lack of information.
Nevertheless the existing security and privacy concerns, due to
the popularity of current Bluetooth-based contact tracing, new
schemes with different solutions should consider to be back-
ward compatible with existing solutions. In the recent search
of blockchain-enabled Bluetooth contact tracing solution [13],
the decentralization brings further protection of user privacy,
and it can be made compatible with our proposed BeepTrace,
thanks to its adoption of blockchain solution. Meanwhile, the
problem of locally initiated proximity solutions is limited due
to the transmission power limit on the user device and existing
wireless interference. As discussed earlier, TraceTogether is
a centralized service in terms of the user’s real identity and
notification, though user privacy is not known to the third party
but the authority. Therefore, it is considered not genuinely
privacy-serving, if the malicious activity is by the central
service provider.
Google Apple Contact Tracing employs a similar approach
with Bluetooth LE too. It is different from TraceTogether from
the user’s privacy perspective since the service provider does
not get hold of the user’s real identity, hence becomes privacy-
preserving. However, the user is required to use their central
server for contact matching and notification, which brings the
concern of trajectory attack on user privacy and enables the
reconstruction of the user’s profile using access information to
the server. Similarly, the UK NHS COVID-19 App has risks
of potential exposures of user privacy in the same way.
Health Code System is different from the above methods, as
it does not use Bluetooth nor proximity detection. It is based
on relational cross-match by scanning the QR code, which is
associated with the user. In this system, user privacy is not
respected due to centralization, and the identity of the user is
not hidden to the authority. However, the health code is only
scanned at the time of passing checkpoints, hence saves the
user battery and does not consume data. Additional, thanks
to its highly central hierarchy, the coverage can be extended
easily.
Many other protocols and solutions are emerging to deal
with pandemic contact tracing, such as Aarogya Setu, COVID-
Safe, Decentralised Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing,
Pan-European Privacy-Preserving Proximity Tracing [14]–
[17], etc. They are similar to the solutions described above
3with their tweaks on certain features.
C. Blockchain basis for contact tracing
The nature of contact tracing brings challenges in privacy
since the information has to be collected, matched and dis-
tributed. Other issues include guaranteeing the protection of
the identity of users with COVID-19. Though the opt-in option
could ensure some control over participation, it is yet to be
seen how we ensure that only the relevant data are shared.
Blockchain can play a neutral role in a distributed manner to
bridge the user/patient and the authorized solvers to desensitize
the user ID and location information. It can provide a solution
for privacy-preserving from technical design rather than rely-
ing on the obey the regulations or laws in a centralized system.
Furthermore, blockchain technology when combined with the
use of encryption and anonymization technologies can further
protect the users’ identity. Blockchain in nature is non-regional
thus provide a suitable global access platform for COVID-
19 pandemic tracing and control. The transparency feature
can prevent the public from intentional misinformation by
authorities or other third parties. More details about blockchain
will be provided in Section II.
D. Motivation
Recognizing the challenges and issues above, enhanced
privacy preservation, better tracing performance, and better
capability to fight against misinformation are required for the
post-pandemic contact tracing. We deem that no compromise
should be made between the privacy and tracing performance,
hence we present our blockchain-enabled contact tracing that
satisfies both privacy and performance requirements. We have
summarized these aspects below:
a) Enhanced privacy as the main focus: Contact tracing
in nature is sensitive to the general public’s privacy and
security, hence the privacy should be respected in the solution
framework design. It is the most concerning factor in all
contact tracing proposals we have seen recently. Meanwhile,
and the more information collected, the better performance of
contact tracing. However, privacy should never be sacrificed.
Meanwhile, the secured data sharing is another challenge for
privacy, it would be a hard decision to make, choosing between
health and the consent of centralized privacy collection, since
the centralization brings the risk of manipulation and corrup-
tion. Nevertheless, it is not a trouble for blockchain, where
the identity is removed at the beginning, offering the tracing
participants with ultimate confidence in privacy.
b) No compromise of tracing performance: By preserv-
ing the privacy from the users, we believe the performance of
contact tracing also matters. The performance of the tracing
network should be valued from its effectiveness of infection
prevention, including the level of technology and the coverage
of the network. The current decentralized solutions are limited
to a local network, hence do not have impacts on a wider range
of users. For example, people who travel across different areas
for work and leisure in the post lockdown period may benefit
from a wider range of tracing. Blockchain in nature can be
the key to enable the globally accessible tracing network. It
is also a challenge for government-initiated tracing projects
or Apple Google joint effort [5]–[7], since their reach is
limited either by political or technical reasons, for instance,
Google has no accessibility in China. We aim to utilize the
blockchain, making all users connected to the chain without
violating their privacy. Moreover, to make use of all the
possible tracing information, a framework for supporting all
means of positioning technologies is required. The information
shared on the blockchain can hence be propagated further and
is a lot richer than Bluetooth interactions.
c) No panic from misinformation: Misinformation is
harmful to pandemic prevention and causes panic to the
general public. The main reason for the misinformation can
be concluded into two categories: information inaccuracy and
information transparency. The public health agencies have
strong reasons to get the trusted authorities involved in the
result confirmation, geographical matching, and notification,
in order to fight against misinformation of inaccuracy. Though
getting the authorities involved might not sound promising for
the fact of privacy, it is not the case for the blockchain network,
thanks to the privacy-preserving ability. The panic should not
be caused by the tracing and never will be. Meanwhile, the
authorities have the motivation to hold back information or
provide false statistics due to their favor of decisions enabled
by the centralization of data. With the help of the transparency
provided by the blockchain technology, it enables the easy
verifiable trusted tracing information by the public rather than
a closed group of informants.
d) Full life cycle privacy protection: It is acknowledged
widely that privacy should be valued from the start to its end,
hence a full life cycle solution of privacy for contact tracing is
necessary. The shared data should have its life cycle managed
from users’ tip of fingers. The users of contact tracing shall
have full privilege to share and revoke sharing at any time us-
ing key management. Public agencies are also required to limit
the sharing of users’ sensitive information within a trusted
and audited partnership. The proposed blockchain platform is
capable of providing users and agencies with thorough creden-
tial management functionality with cryptography. The user’s
privacy is protected throughout the tracing scheme, and the
length of data storage should also be regulated under General
Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) [18], and health agencies’
recommendations, for example, World Health Organization
(WHO) recommended that 14 days is the minimum length of
tracing cycle. In short, the user will have all its privacy pro-
tected through generation, sharing, and deposition. However,
due to technical restrictions of blockchain, the data cannot be
removed from the blockchain but stored as cyphertext that no
one has the key to access after the regulated length of storage.
As for the plaintext stored by the solver, solvers are required
to discard them under the regulation of GDPR, and other data
protection acts, reinforced by public auditions.
E. Contributions
Considering all the motivations listed above, there is a
need for a novel solution that copes with issues in exist-
ing labor-intensive and restrained Bluetooth contact tracing
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Fig. 1. Framework of Blockchain-enabled Privacy-preserving contact tracing scheme (BeepTrace)
solutions. This paper proposes a well defined Blockchain-
EnablEd Privacy-preserving contact Tracing (BeepTrace) for
maximum privacy preservation, making an efficient network
of contact tracing, breaking the information barriers without
scarifying privacy. User privacy is respected with full life
cycle awareness, as it can be generated, shared, and disposed
of safely. Meanwhile, BeepTrace proposes an architectural
view of blockchain address and transaction design making
use of two chains, to facilities the analysis of geodata and
passive notification. We propose a novel scheme to decouple
user privacy by using two distributed blockchains. The tracing
chain with desensitized personal location information is ac-
cessible by authorized solvers for contact matching. And the
notification chain, where the match results (only pseudonym
or its fingerprint) will be published on for the exposed users-
self matching locally. Through this Gemini chain design, all
users’ privacy can be preserved effectively. We also provide
numerical results to give an overview of the network storage
and computing capacity requirement with typical parameters
setting. In addition to network cost, an analysis of data
consumption for an individual user is also calculated to address
the concerns of the device requirement.
The solution proposed in Fig. 1 of this paper provides
an open initiative framework for governments, authorities,
companies, software developers and researchers around the
world to develop and deploy a fast and trusted platform for
tracing information sharing, to minimizes the damage COVID-
19 does to humanity and to save lives and economy without
invading the basic human rights of privacy.
II. BLOCKCHAIN AS THE BACKBONE FOR
PRIVACY-PRESERVING INFORMATION SHARING
Blockchain technology, which has shown great potentials
in various fields such as financial services, energy trading,
supply chain, identity management, and the Internet of Things
(IoT) [19], [20] could address the trust, privacy, security, and
transparency issues associated with the existing contact tracing
technologies. Blockchains are distributed databases organized
using a hash tree, which is naturally tamper-proof and irre-
versible [21]. In particular, data introduced into the blockchain
platform are organized into blocks. Each block has an asso-
ciated hash value for that block, this applies to the previous
5block as well and thus ensures a retroactive linkage between
blocks. Blockchain offers an immutable, transparent, secure,
and auditable ledger in a trust-less distributed environment, to
verify the integrity and tractability of information/assets during
their life cycle.
Blockchain can be integrated into contract tracing applica-
tions to provide much need security, trust, transparency, and
privacy which are either missing or partially provisioned in the
existing schemes. Besides its chain-link data structure nature,
the Consensus Mechanism (CM) is of great importance to
achieving the unique gains of blockchain. The CM ensures
an unambiguous ordering of transactions and guarantees the
integrity and consistency of the blockchain across geographi-
cally distributed nodes. The CM largely determines blockchain
system performance, such as transaction throughput, delay,
node scalability, and security level, etc. As such, depending on
application scenarios and performance requirements, different
CMs have been considered for blockchain. Important require-
ments to be considered when selecting the CM in BeepTrace
include network throughput, delay, storage, and scalability.
Commonly used CMs include Proof of Work (PoW), Proof
of Stake (PoS) and Direct Acyclic Graph (DAG) based CM.
PoW was proposed in the original blockchain application
(Bitcoin) and its core idea is the competition of computing
power. Each node involved in the CM uses its computing
resource for the hash process to compete for the right to the
new block while receiving some bonus. This leads to the use
of computing resources and meaningless energy consumption.
PoS, on the other hand, relies on coin age competition rather
than computing power competition. PoS is thus beneficial
for the wealthy miner and it could cause near-monopolies,
which can result in the generation of a powerful third-party.
This could also be a challenge in BeepTrace where the users’
privacy at stake. By design, a more balanced weighting scheme
on coin age can solve such a problem. Both PoW and PoS
CM work on a single chain architecture. To maintain a single
version of the blockchain among the users, the CM must
reduce the access rate of new blocks [19]. This could lead
to some bottlenecks in applying PoW and PoS CMs to a large
number of contact tracing participants (e.g., a country with a
large population like China, India).
In particular, to reduce the access rate of new blocks and
prevent the PoW or PoS based BeepTrace system from attack,
the CM will consume many resources, which is too costly
for such a resource-constrained system. Furthermore, with the
limited capacity of the new blocks in PoS and PoW, the system
will be unable to cope with the exponential growth in the
number of users. For instance, the throughput is normally
limited to 7 transactions per second (TPS) in Bitcoin and 20
to 30 TPS in Ethereum [22]. The low access rate of new
blocks in PoW and PoS CMs implies a long confirmation
delay for the CMs. Typical confirmation delays of 60 minutes
in Bitcoin and three minutes in Ethereum are too long for
the BeepTrace system since other delays within the network
such as access delay, processing delay must be incorporated
as well. Nevertheless, the throughput and delay performance
can be significantly enhanced by reducing the difficulty level
of harsh calculation security level (e.g., in BeepTrace, there
is no need to wait for the block confirmation after 6 blocks
are generated after it). Furthermore, a small to medium size
population city could be used for contact tracing.
DAG-based CM can overcome the shortcomings of PoW
and PoS consensus when applied in BeepTrace. Unlike PoW
and PoS, there are no competitions to create a new block in
DAG and all transactions are connected directly or indirectly.
DAG-based consensus mechanism allows users to insert their
blocks into the blockchain at any time, as long as they process
the earlier transactions. In this way, many branches would be
generated simultaneously, which is referred to as forking. With
forking the confirmation rate and the TPS are both unlimited
in DAG-based CM. Moreover, with the forking integrated
into DAG, the resource consumption can be very low for
a user to create a new block, thus making it very suitable
for the BeepTrace system. Other key benefits of DAG-based
CM which make it more suitable for BeepTrace include zero
transaction fees and low computing power [19].
III. BLOCKCHAIN ENABLED PRIVACY-PRESERVING
CONTACT TRACING
In this section, we give a detailed workflow description and
an explanation of key concepts. In the following parts, we will
first introduce the entities involved in the system, their roles,
and how they interface with each other. The workflow of the
contact tracing framework will be proposed next, then we will
explore the details of blockchain pseudonym generation and
sharing.
It is worth noting that the framework works with an open
initiative that allows everyone to share the contact tracing
information with different methods, authorities, and cryptog-
raphy, and it can become a piece of open interface infor-
mation tracing hub for all privacy-preserving contact tracing
providers globally. Moreover, the proposed framework does
not limit the selection of blockchain CM and the incentive
mechanism of the blockchain. As long as the CM fits the
network’s performance requirement, it can be plugged into the
framework. Besides, the framework does not limit the selection
of positioning services.
A. Entities, functions and interfaces
In the following, we define the parties involved in Beep-
Trace and explain their roles and interfaces one by one:
• Users (see Fig. 1, includes confirmed patients and healthy
users), is an abstract term of contact tracing App users
on a mobile device. We use “user” to represent user
equipment (UE), the App, and the device in the rest of the
paper. All users will upload their encrypted TraceCode to
tracing blockchain and read from notification blockchain
for self matching.
• Diagnosticians (see Fig. 1), diagnose and endorse con-
firmed COVID-19 user’s geodata with a signed prefix and
send to tracing blockchain for solver matching.
• Geodata solvers (see Fig. 1), server or server clusters as-
sociated with the trusted third party or user, interacts with
the geodata and provides endorsement on the notification
6chain. Reads raw data from tracing blockchain for match-
ing and send matched data to notification blockchain.
• Public Key Infrastructure (PKI)/Certified Authority (CA)
(see Fig. 1), a trusted third party (e.g., governments,
public health agencies), interacts in key distribution to
the user, diagnostician, and solvers.
• Positioning service providers (see Fig. 1), including but
not limited to GNSS, Bluetooth, cellular tower and WiFi,
which are self-supplied by the user. Data supplied by the
provider will be labeled as geodata throughout this paper.
Note that, BeepTrace does not use Bluetooth grouping
method nor exchange any information with nearby Blue-
tooth users, instead BeepTrace will only allow Bluetooth
to passively receive information from nearby beacons, as
it uses Bluetooth purely as a positioning service when it
is available.
• Tracing blockchain (see Fig. 2), is one of two chains
(will be introduced in detail in Section III-C) that accept
TraceCode registration by user and diagnostician. It is
also read by the solver for geodata matching.
• Notification blockchain (see Fig. 2), is the chain dedicated
to risk registration to the affected users’ TraceCode.
• TraceCode (see Fig. 2), is a mask name for the blockchain
address introduced in the paper, it has two parts, the front
part is the user pseudonym, called prefix, the rear part is
geodata cyphertext, called suffix.
B. Workflow of the BeepTrace
We explain BeepTrace using Fig. 1 and we give details step-
by-step.
The first step (step 1) of our proposed BeepTrace is that
PKI/CA distributes the keys to the above parties, as suggested
in Fig. 1. Users will collect raw geodata from the positioning
service providers, indicated with Step 2, and generate multiple
local private keys over time (e.g., one for each day), these
keys will be stored in users local storage, preferably, in an
encrypted chip like Apple T2 Security Chip [23], as in Step 3.
Such encryption will be strong enough to protect users’ privacy
from any known threats and avoid human mistakes. These keys
will be used to generate a pseudonym, which is used as the
prefix of a blockchain address, the front part of TraceCode.
Note that, both symmetric-key and asymmetric, aka. public-
key encryption can be used for the user’s key generation and
management.
On the other hand, the user generates another cyphertext
using a public key, which is certified by a CA (a trusted party),
to encrypt its current geographical or topological location
data with a timestamp in step 4, and forms the rear part of
TraceCode. Note that CA is introduced to provide confidence
to the public but not tempering the independence of BeepTrace
as it does not obtain any privacy from the user. We call
this geodata cyphertext, and it will be used as a suffix of a
blockchain address which is associated with the pseudonym,
stated as address fusion in Step 5.
Furthermore, in order to fight corruption on positioning
service and fake transaction, a local authorization code from
installed APP by confirming the location from two or more
positioning providers should be submitted to PKI/CA to obtain
the public key, in other words, the APP needs to verify if the
UE has two or more confident positions from two or more
location service providers (the detailed number depends on the
device and the available service). By verifying the geolocation
within the APP, the APP will generate an authorization code,
which will be used to request the public key. Location service
providers including GNSS, cellular tower, WiFi and Bluetooth
beacons can be used to provide a trustworthy location against
malicious information.
At this point, we have successfully established the first
link of a user pseudo-identity and the geodata in the form
of blockchain addresses. Once the address is generated, the
user will declare it on the blockchain network (see details in
Section III-C) in Step 6, hence the address becomes index-
able using its suffix by the trusted third party, and the users’
privacy remains protected due to the anonymous identity by
the pseudonym. Note that, all users in the network will repeat
steps 1 to 6 until the user is diagnosed with COVID-19. The
following steps are for the confirmed patient.
Once a user is diagnosed by a diagnostician, the user has
options to exchange its existing pseudonyms with the current
handler by giving the patient’s consent to this very specific
diagnostician in step 7. After receiving all the pseudonyms
from the users, this diagnostician tracks down all the related
addresses using the prefix thanks to the users. During the
pseudonym exchange, the trusted one needs to verify the
pseudonyms (see details in Section III-C). Meanwhile, this
diagnostician decouples all the user private key related prefix
from the geodata suffix, and replace the pseudonym section
with his/her certificate, issued by CA. The diagnostician
generates a new blockchain address by re-coupling the new
prefix and new suffix, which can be generated with man-made
drifting/noise encryption technique for further protection, then
endorse it on the blockchain network, as in step 8.
From this point, the users’ privacy is completely pro-
tected/preserved. The privacy is only revealed in the process
of been diagnosed due to the nature of the diagnosis, and
it is protected under regulations and laws, for instance, the
confidentiality of the UK NHS (National Health Service) code
of practice [24] and GDPR.
After the confirmed patient’s status has been updated on the
tracing blockchain, illustrated in blue in Fig. 2, anybody with
access to the chain will be able to read the cyphertext and
know the update made by the diagnostician, though access to
the geodata is exclusive to the geo private key holder, issued by
a public trusted parties with the previously mentioned public
keys, via secured channels. Again, the information has no user
info, at step 9 in Fig. 1. At the same time, the link of the
pseudonym is only known to the user itself.
Now we have all the required information for contact tracing
(that is, an irreversible link of pseudonyms and geodata, and
the diagnostician’s endorsement to the geodata), the only thing
left is to match them, as shown in Step 10. Any interested
parties/users (in Fig. 1) who are authorized by the CA can start
backtracking the geodata from confirmed patients which are
marked by the diagnosticians by decryption of the geodata and
timestamp. By doing so, if cross-infection is likely between
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Fig. 2. BeepTrace blockchain address architecture (TraceCode)
several blockchain addresses, the solvers will make an update
of risk level to related addresses by looking up the suffix and
endorse it on the blockchain, but they will not be able to
know the user’s information due to the decoupled data and
pseudonyms. The marked addresses are declared again on the
notification blockchain (see details in Section III-C) in Step
11.
As the user is using the tracing App, when the download
of notification has finished locally in Step 12 (details are
given in Section III-C), the user can look up its addresses
from the notification blockchain, which is a separate chain
exclusive for risk level notification, and now the users are been
notified passively once the match of addresses has occurred
with endorsements made to any of users’ addresses. In the case
of compressed results on the notification chain, the user needs
to match its prefix’s fingerprint with them. In this process,
the user’s privacy is well preserved locally, as no one without
knowing the users’ keys can link the user to the geodata.
A sub addresses scheme can be introduced to power the self-
marking with symptoms code, without the involvement of CA.
The code can be a plaintext hash and installed as the prefix
of blockchain address with public key encrypted geodata.
The solver can also dedicate to search the symptoms and
warn others using the same technique in the previous scenario
(steps 1, 2, 4, 5, 6 and 3 is dismissed due to plaintext), but
the information propagated through unsigned address are not
trusted, and should only be taken seriously if the community
has a wide range trust basis. No personal keys are revealed in
this process, hence the privacy is well preserved too.
C. Blockchain pseudo-identity sharing
In Fig. 2, we illustrate the generation of blockchain ad-
dresses and the mechanism to decouple the users’ privacy
with the diagnosis (a signature by diagnostician) and geodata
sharing. Sharing of the pseudonym generated by users’ private
8keys are considered safe to be public. A handful of cryp-
tography algorithms can be applied to pseudonym generation,
including both symmetrical and asymmetrical encryption. In
the figure, we can see that the address is divided into two
parts, pseudonym prefix and geodata suffix. The user uses the
private key to generate a cyphertext as its pseudonym for the
front part of the address, as in Fig. 1 step 3, and uses a public
key offered by regional/global CA to encrypt its geodata, in
step 4. It then puts the cyphertext of geodata into later part
of the blockchain address as the suffix. A complete address
shall provide a direct link between the pseudo-identity and
the geodata in step 5. Besides, the diagnostician will need to
verify whether the user is the rightful holder of pseudonyms
by verifying the private keys held by the user. This ensures
that the diagnosis information is shared responsibly, and is
thus a critical step to avoiding public panic.
By sharing this address with the blockchain network, the
information carried by the address itself will be known as
a cyphertext, and potential readers will know how to sepa-
rate the cyphertext into pseudonym and geodata cyphertext.
However, only the authorized users/servers who have the
private key from the authority can decrypt the geodata but
they have no clue of the pseudonym, therefore protecting
users’ privacy. Interactions between tracing blockchain and
notification blockchain in Fig. 2 are designed to offload the
needs of a heavy tracing chain and enable a trusted blockchain
with trusted users/servers, as only selective information will
be published to this dedicated chain from trusted sources.
Meanwhile, the users’ traces of internet connectivity are also
concealed by blockchain, hence we can assure that what on
the blockchain is nothing but a pseudonym and a geodata.
Miners of the blockchain may receive connectivity trace from
the user, but it is not inherited on the blockchain, either
received constantly by one miner due to rapid changes of
non-geographical related miners. In other words, users access
information such as IP addresses, routing information, and
even the Internet Service Provider (ISP) records are completely
isolated from the blockchain network, hence the network is
born to be real privacy-preserving. This advantage may be
overkill for some countries’ regulations, but it will be a gem
of privacy-preserving.
IV. GEODATA GENERALIZATION FOR PRIVACY
PROTECTION AND SOLVING
Contact tracing blockchain is not limited to any specific
geographical or topological information collected by GNSS,
Wifi, Bluetooth, base station, and any other indoor or outdoor
positioning technologies. It is a platform that fuses all types
of geodata and shares them for geodata matching. With the
help of BeepTrace, the user privacy is in safe hands, however,
it still faces a challenge of geodata overhearing issued. This
is a critical challenge during the geodata capturing and the
protection of privacy and granularity of data accuracy in
addition to the secured mainframe design. We present our
geodata generalization plan to guide geodata capturing and
storing.
The raw geodata is generated by GNSS/WiFi/Cellular tower
when the services are available to the users. Next, the users’
device will upload them to the blockchain network with
a public key issued by CA. Meanwhile, the geodata will
undergo perturbations here to avoid identical suffix match
tracing against the patient’s private key, by either adding salt to
geodata or transform the geodata. The relevant transformations
can be achieved in three ways:
• Use geo datum with an elliptical encrypted system with
perturbation, a well-known example of the implementa-
tion is GCJ-02 datum reference system.
• Convert GPS geo datum (WGS84) [25] to the Grid
reference system (OSNG: OSGB36, where the accuracy
is limited).
• Geographical Information System (GIS) aggregation/
geodata generalization and perturbation to avoid trajec-
tory privacy tracking.
The user has the freedom to choose which level of detail it
intends to provide to the blockchain tracing network, as long
as the accuracy level fits within the regulation made by the
local agency. In addition to that, the diagnostician can use
the above methods again to convert the users’ geodata into a
coarser grain to avoid trajectory tracing by malicious users or
even completely reconstructing the geodata with a dedicated
key for secured geodata sharing if required. The management
of geodata allows fine-grained access control to be achieved
on the blockchain.
A. Geodata solving and reverse topological cross-infection
warning
Contact tracing is closely related to geographical intersec-
tions of the traced target, which is represented as a set of
geodata. A first-party or third-party solver is needed to decrypt
the geodata from the cyphertext first, then run the patients’
every record against the whole data collected within 14 days
for COVID-19 tracing (recommended by WHO and it could be
different for other pandemics). The most simple way to this is
to calculate a distance-vector which will be used as the metric
along with the contact duration for the risk level assessment.
Besides the geographical information, the Bluetooth group
information can also be integrated into the network, if the
users are willing to link them. This will solve the limited
proximity issues for all Bluetooth technology-based contact
tracing solutions [5], [7] by extending the tracing to more
possible positioning services, and enriching the geo solving
model in the solver side.
Third-party GIS services can be integrated. For example,
any solver can link the geodata with Open Street Map (OSM)
[26] to get GIS data from OSM and make use of the infor-
mation like object type, road topology, building name and
function, the height of the object, etc., which can be fused
into risk level management. For instance, the road topology
can indicate the trajectory, determine if the user is outdoor or
indoor. Such information fusion and processing can bring the
contact tracing not only beyond the geodata, but also explores
social connections. Speaking of which, it is unimaginable if
the privacy is exposed or hijacked by any malicious party,
therefore, privacy-preserving is not an option but a must. By
adding the GIS into the solving loop, the external topology
9can be taken into account, for example, if the geodata is
found out to be at the center of a shopping mall, then the
shopping mall’s topological information can be obtained from
OSM and used to warn the rest of the people who were in
the shopping mall at the same time. This method provides
more flexibility compared to solely coordinates/proximity, as
portrayed in TraceTogether [5] and NHSX contact tracing [7].
B. Risk level management and notification
Once the geodata solver extracts the high profile geodata
using a clinical endorsement, the matching is conducted. The
risk level, therefore, can be worked out using the government
guideline on the distance and contact time. For instance, any
users who were within the proximity of 10 meters more than
15 minutes will be marked as High-risk exposure [27], and
those who were further and stayed less than 15 minutes will
receive a low-risk exposure endorsement. With the enhanced
topological matching, the details can be set up by the solver
itself with certified guides by authority, for example, if the
authority thinks the indoor activity brings the risks to every
people in the facility, then the topological information can be
used for marking. The result will be linked to the address who
has an endorsement from the solver. The address is considered
to be notified passively at this stage. It is worth noting that the
risk level endorsement is public information, but the only way
to make use of them is to look up the prefix and identify users
themselves actively. The process is like a radio broadcast, and
the receivers are listening to it passively. There are drawbacks
of passive notifications regarding its performance (discussed
in Section VI-D), but this will again double assure the users’
privacy is protected by design (no trust is needed).
C. Complete freedom of pseudonym revoking and sifting
In the geodata matching process, there is a risk of trajectory
tracing against users’ pseudonym, however, users have com-
plete freedom to change their private key more frequently to
avoid any possible leak of privacy, with the cost of increasing
data consumption and storage.
Users can renounce the private key at any time and start
using a new private key at will, in order to prevent anyone
from retrospectively using the logs to reveal the users’ activity
pattern. In the case that a user wants to revoke shared data
from BeepTrace, it can do so by informing the PKI/CA to
revoke the public key assigned to its geodata, hence revoking
the information back and forth.
V. RESULTS
In the results, we first present an analysis of existing
solutions to contact tracing, which we compare with our
proposed solution referred to as BeepTrace. Then we provide
numerical results to show BeepTrace’s performance in terms
of blockchain requirements of throughput and storage. Next,
we analyze the computing resource requirement for geodata
matching with some illustrative figures. In the end, we work
out the user side requirement regarding data consumption and
storage.
A. Comparisons with existing contact tracing solutions
By comparing the efforts made by different countries and
agencies, there are clearly two divisions both technical-wise
and privacy-wise. Technical-wise, there are two types of
tracing mechanisms, one uses health code while the other
utilizes Bluetooth. Detailed comparisons of the contact tracing
solutions can be seen in Table I, where we list our BeepTrace
with four widely acknowledged solutions. As discussed earlier
in Section I-B, Bluetooth based solutions, are energy starving
for users, since the device must be kept active and broadcasting
all the time to achieve such functionality. On the other hand,
the health code system only uses the QR code on demand.
Also, due to the fact that Bluetooth processes and matches
local grouping information, and QR code requires a central
server with limited privacy-preservation.
BeepTrace solution sits between them, by recording the
information in the background, but only transmitting at a
suitable time. For instance, while charging or docking the de-
vice, hence BeepTrace is not only privacy-preserving but also
power preserving and battery friendly. Furthermore, BeepTrace
brings a higher level of security to the user physical device as
it overcomes the issue of Bluetooth wireless vulnerability and
avoids the bureaucracy flaws in the health code system.
Meanwhile, since the Bluetooth only works locally, the
coverage is also limited, whereas BeepTrace, using integrated
services from the user and third party suppliers, the coverage
can be boosted globally without much effort.
Besides, as opposed to centralized solutions or partially
decentralized service, for example, Google and Apple need
a central service to respond to APIs and geodata matching,
which is risky as the access tracking is possible. BeepTrace
demonstrates the incomparable benefits of security and privacy
preservation as a completely decentralized service. While
BeepTrace employs third-party servers for matching, it keeps
the user privacy protected and preserved thanks to the passive
listening mechanism to avoid triggering access tracking. In
addition to the power and privacy concern, BeepTrace is a
unique solution to handle the user’s location with full life cycle
care without giving up on privacy.
It is worth pointing out that not likely mobile device has
the interest of being a blockchain committing/mining node,
which consumes data/storage and computing resources, but
many participants with computers and servers are eager to
help. Nevertheless, it does not stop mobile phones joining
the blockchain network, helping boost the network capacity
and propagating the blockchain to nearby network nodes
by running a thin-client on the mobile phones. In addition,
blockchain can have variable consensus with different levels
of computational requirements and communication costs. It is
preferable to adopt a resource-light consensus, such as Proof-
of-stake or voting-based consensus, RAFT, and PBFT. The
advantages of using light consensus will release the compu-
tational resources, and make blockchain feasible for mobile
device deployment. On the other hand, another light weight
blockchain-enabled solution [13], which uses Bluetooth to
actively exchange information, has introduced local matching
which requires even less computing and networking resources.
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Next, we will numerically analyze the BeepTrace per-
formance in terms of the storage at blockchain, computing
complexity at the server, and user data consumption.
B. Blockchain performance requirement
Storing massive amounts of blockchain addresses is a bold
challenge of contact tracing blockchain, due to the accumu-
lating data uploaded by users. Therefore, a certain period of
lifespan should be considered for the application of such a
system. Thankfully, the contact tracing only requires a certain
number of days of records (14 days only for COVID-19
according to WHO, which will be used as an example later),
hence any data older than that number can be discarded. By
estimating the number of participants and the size of each
blockchain address, we plot in Fig. 3 the maximum allowed
storage of 14 days with new addresses declared every 30
minutes from each user, against the number of participants.
In addition, we plot the number of TPS against an increasing
number of users. The lines in blue and red compare the
capacity between using 512 bit (64byte) and 256 bit (32byte)
address, both of them end at approximately 200TB of data.
It is worth pointing out that only the geodata solver requires
such an amount of data for problem-solving, but for miners,
the required blocks can be set to the newest dozens of blocks,
which may just take a few megabytes. In terms of notification
of blockchain, at the scale of 10,000 confirmed cases per day
(see details in user side analysis), the total amount of storage
required is far less (a few GB comparing with several hundreds
of TB). Though the main computing resources are for geodata
solving, it is worth mentioning the actual computing cost
of blockchain mining is an arbitrary value decided by the
consensus itself, in our case, preferred consensus like PBFT
and RAFT only requires a marginal computing requirement
for the miner nodes, and for the Proof-of-work and Proof-of-
Stake, the computing requirement is decided by the difficulty
of the nonce solving [20], which is affected by the TPS and
security requirement for the whole network.
Transaction per second is a critical performance metric for
the blockchain network. Using the assumption above, each
user generates 1 address in 30 minutes, with N users, the
addresses uploaded to the system per second is calculated as
N × 130×60 . Such an amount of TPS is the core challenge
for BeepTrace deployment on a large scale, hence mitigation
should be considered to address the large TPS threshold, which
is detailed in Section VI.
C. Geodata computing resource requirement
Once the users start uploading their geodata, the server is
involved with the job of geodata matching. It is a simple job
of looking up the geodata coordinates and comparing it with
all existing records. In this process, we define the workflow
of address lookup and match as: 1. Read one of the confirmed
patient’s geodata; 2. Compute the distance between it and all
records from the latest one and; 3. Make a transaction to the
relevant address with risk level endorsement.
It is reasonable to assume that address lookup would take
less than 0.1 ms a record (as a baseline, many modern pro-
cessors are faster) on single CPU thread or CUDA core [28].
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Hence we can obtain an estimation of computing resource
requirement against the number of users and daily confirmed
cases. In Fig. 4(a), using the same setup from the previous
simulation, i.e., 30 minutes an address regularly in 24 hours a
day, we can see the number of records increases linearly with
the number of daily confirmed cases, but exponentially with
the overall participants’ number. It shows that the system is
linear against increasing confirmed cases but not very scalable
if the network gets larger.
The scalability is also simulated with the above parameters
in Fig. 4(b), where the large tracing network needs more
computing resources by comparing a system of 70 million and
4 billion population. It is evident that the cost of maintaining
a network consisting of billion of users with Quint-scale
message counts is not practical with current technology but
completely manageable if the network scales down. In fact,
for a medium-sized country with 70 million population (For
example, UK, France), the cost of geodata solving is manage-
able with a handful of high-performance cluster servers, which
cost far less than what is required for the larger network. A
detailed breakdown of scalability challenges can be found in
Section VI.
D. User-side resources requirements
Contact tracing process involves both the user end and
the solver end, and the user end is mostly mobile device.
Every user is considered as a thin-node of the blockchain
tracing network, so the retrieving data and lookup records will
take place on the local user and local user only, where the
user privacy is preserved. It is going to consume the user’s
computing, storage, and network resources. In BeepTrace,
the geodata solver marked addresses are announced on the
notification blockchain, which is exclusive to the matching
results. Assuming in each location it stayed, there will be
R = 15 blockchain addresses associated with the patient’s
geodata. Therefore, assume that the patient was traveling
constantly and stayed in different places every 30 minutes
in 14 hours (typical active time for an adult during a day).
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TABLE II
COST AND PRIVACY COMPARISONS OF EXISTING CONTACT TRACING SOLUTIONS WITH BEEPTRACE
Name of solutions
User
cost
Communication
cost
Server
cost
Local security
and privacy
Cyber security
and privacy
TraceTogether [5] Medium Low Low Weak Mediocre
Google/Apple [6] Medium Low Low Weak Strong
UK NHS [7] Medium Low Low Weak Weak
Health Code [8] Low Medium Medium Strong Weak
BeepTrace (proposed solution) Low High High Strong Strong
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It means each patient will incur 420 records for the geodata
solving and accumulating up to 5880 records for a 14 days
interval. Note that, in the real world situation, the patient might
interact with hundreds or even thousands of addresses in one
time at one address, but only the most closed contact will
lead to infection, hence the number of users being tagged by
the geodata solver will be significantly less than the crowds
the patient interacted. By adding all the records up, there is
a challenge of processing and storing such a large volume of
data, as illustrated in Fig. 5. The raw data recorded on the
blockchain will be too heavy for the user side, therefore, we
have to compress the associated blockchain addresses with
MD5 checksum [29] or other fingerprints to reduce the size
of files. Meanwhile, the solver side will need to employ a
mechanism to remove duplicates and produce a single risk
level endorsement for all the match geodata that associated
with a single pseudonym. The number of records can be
reduced to 210 and 16byte for each address’s fingerprint,
which is calculated based on a 14 hour active time per day in
14 days (14 x 15) since the daily records of 28 are summarized
by the solver into one record, and pseudonym changes daily.
By compressing the data using the above methods, we can see
a dramatic drop in data consumption, 33.6MB for R = 15,
6.7MB for R = 3 per day, hence enabling a wider user range
and minimizing the users’ cost. More details regarding storage
optimization can be found in Section VI. As for the uploading
cost, the total amount of data upload to tracing blockchain
throughout a day will be 28 addresses of 64byte, which is
considerably less than download from notification blockchain.
E. Privacy and cost comparisons with existing solutions
BeepTrace shows its unique advantages of privacy-
preserving service, among other existing solutions, and it is
also comparable with them in terms of data consumption and
security. For instance, Google/Apple contact tracing requires
the user to fetch infected identifiers from the server continu-
ally, and the user needs to perform the match locally, in which
senses, the cost has three major aspects, users’ data, users’
computing resources and the server-side resources, including
server communication and computing costs. Hence, we may
compare BeepTrace with other contact tracing schemes using
the above metrics. Meanwhile, as we have emphasized privacy
in the paper, we can distinguish two types of privacy, local pri-
vacy due to the leakage of wireless signal exchanges and cyber
privacy by the access information to the service providers.
The actual cost is controversial for comparisons regarding the
computational infrastructure and data consumption; in fact,
because of the architectural difference, it is very hard to
compare the resources needed for each system.
We have summarized BeepTrace with other solutions re-
garding the cost and privacy metrics in Table II, in which the
cost is computational, and the communication cost is a mutual
cost shared by users and servers for solutions mentioned in
the manuscript. Local security in Table II suggests the local
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wireless vulnerability and the risk of jeopardizing privacy. On
the other hand, cyber security is benchmarked by analyzing the
communication channels security feature and the management
of privacy beyond the user premises.
From Table II, BeepTrace shows the privilege of lower user
end cost and better performance of local and cyber security
with stronger privacy protections.
VI. CHALLENGES AND DISCUSSIONS
A. Network throughput and scalability
The major issues with our proposed contact tracing scheme
are the massive traffic caused by a large amount of addresses
declaration due to frequent (globe) geodata update, and the
computing resources required for geodata matching. Mean-
while, we face a great challenge of blockchain processing
throughput for single-chain operation. It is a great challenge
running the desired hundreds of millions of transactions per
second on any existing blockchain solution. Luckily, the needs
of such high TPS is rare in the real world, for example, it is
reasonable to assume that a user does not travel internationally
often, therefore the needs of the user data are completely
met in the domestic blockchain network. In addition, all
parameters are selected at typical maximum values to see the
peak requirement. For instance, it is not reasonable to assume
all people (in all ages) are active 14 hours every day. We
also encourage the use of multiple blockchains by regionally
grouping the users via PKI and public keys management. By
dividing users into smaller groups, the network capacity can be
easily scaled up. Besides, the emerging high throughput ready
blockchain can be introduced to the deployment of BeepTrace,
for instance, DAG (Directed acyclic graph) in theory has no
throughput limit thanks to its intentionally designed forking
schemes [19]. And when the technology is ready for high
throughput performance, we can easily migrate two or more
regional chains together and speed up the sharing of the
information.
The computing resources are limited from time to time,
however, the geodata complexity can be dramatically reduced
if the user’s quantity on a single chain is below thresholds. In
the case of international passengers, the country can employ
the server to look up the data in both regional networks, hence
reduces the needs of massive networks in all time. We have
made a comparison of simulations based on an assumption of
different size networks. For a medium-sized country with 70
million population, the required computing resource is as little
as dozens of AWS EC2 p3dn.24xlarge instances, however, for
the large population bases, such as the combined population
match of the top 7 most populated countries (a sum of 4 billion
people), it takes tremendous computing resources equaling to
23 of Summit [30] (the fastest supercomputer in 2019) and
hardly achievable using current technology, though it will be
possible in the near future.
Decentralization and blockchain bring huge benefit of
privacy-preservation with a cost. Having BeepTrace and Blue-
tooth based solutions compared with centralized solutions,
for example, Apple/Google contact tracing vs TraceTogether
and Health Code System, decentralized solutions require more
resources for both user and server than centralized solutions.
Without blockchain, we have run into a paradox of privacy,
in which respects to centralization and decentralization. As
it has no way to be decentralized if the user sends the
data to servers directly, nor the decentralization accepts the
cost of downloading and matching locally. However, with
the blockchain and BeepTrace framework’s help, we have
a safe, immutable, and privacy-preserving way passing the
information to the server, hence enabling centralization of data
process, but decentralization of data sharing, with distributed
logged pseudonym and location along with distributed and
passively notification from cherry-picked results.
B. Battery drainage and storage optimization
All the recently proposed contract tracing programs have the
challenge of battery drainage and storage optimization, which
are not avoidable due to the requirements of active broadcast
and recording of GNSS coordinates. However, our scheme
can be more energy efficient by separating the recording
and uploading in two steps. The user can store the recorded
geodata on the local device and wait until it is plugged in
and within the WiFi coverage. By sending the data only when
the mobile device is being charged, our scheme becomes more
battery-friendly. Delaying the information upstream can induce
lower performance in the contact tracing network, but it is
completely acceptable to be notified a few hours later rather
than immediate response due to the nature of tracing lag. Also,
geodata generation is paused if the user’s locations remain the
same, which also reduces the entries to the blockchain. From
the solver side, if the duplicates of endorsement are made, the
solver will only upload the unique address to the blockchain,
which reduces the pressure on the user.
C. Security considerations of private key exchange
Since the private key exchange happens among the PKI and
solvers, which is a not good practice in the world of the Inter-
net. To overcome the risks of leaking the private keys among
PKI and solvers, we need to reinforce the communication
channel between solver servers and the PKI with commercial
off-the-shelf (COTS) cypher suites and protocols, for instance,
Secure Sockets Layers (SSL) and Transport Layer Security
(TLS), as suggested in Fig. 1, where the key distribution from
PKI/CA to solvers has an additional layer of security. At the
same time, encryption of the private key is a common solution
for enhanced secured communication, by sharing the encrypted
private key with servers using a master symmetrical key,
and managed the master key securely by employing intensive
security methods, for instance, physical key distributions and
audition for physical key distribution. The risk of losing private
keys can be minimized. As the private expiration is possible
by updating new private keys, the damage of session/period-
based private key leakage can also be controlled. Meanwhile,
with the regulation in mind, many physical add-on security
features can be used for PKI-to-Solver communications.
D. Technology for elders and minors
Technology has certain advantages to the general public,
however, elders and minors are often left out. The limits of
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technology reach to certain groups of people may become a
major issue at rolling out digital contact tracing. But it is not
completely impossible to include them. Wearable technology
and wireless IoT [31] can be used by the elders and minors
to enable them for the contact tracing program. Under the
scheme developed in the earlier section, the private keys were
stored locally, but are transferable to guardians and carers. By
transferring the private keys in a secured D2D channel [32],
the parents and carers can take responsibility to keep their
beloved under protection, without giving up on their privacy.
As discussed earlier, the risk level assessment is notified
only via a passive broadcast, however, it is not limited to the
passive-only situation. It is very likely that elders and minors
will not be putting enough effort to receive the notifications,
hence a trusted third party is needed in this case. By giving
consent of privacy to some other users or third-party service
providers, they can start sending push messages to the vul-
nerable once there is a risk. People naturally do give their
privacy consent to the above parties, for example, care homes,
online health companies, parents and adult children of elders.
By combining these avenues, we believe no one should be left
out in this crisis.
E. Economical and social aspects
It is well-known that centralized systems are more efficient
and economical than decentralized systems in most cases.
Blockchain is a representative of distributed systems and
deploying such a system in a nationwide manner may cost
taxpayers more. However, from another side, the decentralized
blockchain system is also well-recognized among citizens as
a non-governmental solution that can preserve privacy in a
much better way than a centralized system. Such a consensus
can effectively minimize the resistance from human rights
organizations and fear of citizens of infringing rights or other
fundamental civil liberties. This will increase the uptake of
the digital contact tracing among the citizens and is thus of
paramount importance to winning the battle with COVID-19
as early as possible and to save billions each day.
From the blockchain mining perspective, attracting suffi-
cient independent miners to contribute the blockchain con-
struction is key to maintaining its nature of the distribution. In
the most successful blockchains such as Bitcoin, the reward
to the miners are from the transaction fees and/or creating
a new block. In BeepTrace, it could be difficult to build
such an ecosystem in a short time and there are no real
transactions (thus no transaction fees) in such a system. As
solutions, the reward can come from the government by paying
the miners who created and maintained the blockchain, or
in the case of sharing some existing blockchains, transaction
fees can be claimed back from the government. Of course,
conquering COVID-19 is the common mission of all mankind
thus each user could be part of the miners to voluntarily
support, legitimize, and monitor the blockchain network.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
A blockchain-enabled solution is proposed to solve the
critical privacy-preserving issues in digital contact tracing for
COVID-19 pandemic. The blockchains are enabled between
the user/patient and the authorized solvers to desensitize
the geodata from the user identity. Detailed procedures and
functions of each entity are presented and compared with
existing solutions to show the advantages. Challenges are
also discussed from blockchain performance, solvers complex-
ity, user’s battery and storage, economic and social aspects,
respectively. Our numerical results show that the proposed
BeepTrace is the all around winner from security, privacy,
battery, coverage perspectives. This solution provides an in
time framework for governments, authorities, companies, and
research institutes over the world to develop a trusted platform
for tracing information sharing, to win the fight with the
COVID-19 pandemic.
The future work regarding the extensible plug-in secu-
rity feature for BeepTrace framework is under investigation.
Meanwhile, the future plan of extracting the passive message
function from BeepTrace and making the framework into
a general Blockchain-enabled Privacy-preserving Messaging
service (BeepMess) is under planning. In addition to the
technical aspect of BeepTrace, we are looking forward to
implementing the BeepTrace in the current contact tracing
schemes with commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) cryptography
components. BeepTrace is under development and it has also
received invitation of trials in the collaborated universities
and local communities, to bring BeepTrace to life in the
near future. Additionally, we are in active search of potential
solution for lowering the intensive computational requirement
of blockchain nodes with scale down practiceattempts, the
effect of scaling down the network can reduce the competition
and communication requirement among peer nodes but yet to
verify the security and privacy protection performance.
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